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The Challenge of Soviet Power

The subject of my contribution to your 27th Annual Convention is, The Challenge of Soviet Power. This topic is a particularly appropriate one for the Edison Electric Institute. It was Lemin the defined Communism as the Soviet system plus electrification. The first Soviet economic plus, dating back to the early 1920's, had as its principal objective, the development of a modern electric power system.

Today, electric power is indispensable to military power. It operates the radars which are on watch against smeak attack. It makes possible the rapid transmission of timely warning to safeguard our mation. Without a large electric power industry, make production of nuclear weapons would be impossible.

In our own intelligence business, electric power is no less vital. Intelligence depends upon the timely interpretation of hundreds of thousands of bits and pieces of information that flow into Washington every day. From the initial collection of information to its final analysis and dissemination, electronic machinery is a valued partner.

Electronics are a powerful cold war vector of the USSR and its allies in the Communist empire.

No country, not even Hitler's Gormany, has used radio in a massive effort to premote subversive policy as does the Seviet Union. Literally millions of words, arguing the ease for communism, are beaused to the Free World every day. Wisely, I believe, the Free World takes no steps to jam Communist radio propagands. At the same time, the Soviet Bloc spends wast sums to jam the broadcasts which this government and other free governments beam to the Communist world. They have tried to build an electronic iron curtain around the minds of their own people.

It is no secident that the electronics production is one of the fastest growing industries in the Soviet Union. USSR output increased eight times between 1950 and 1958, to reach a level roughly half that of the electronics industry of the United States. Last year their production of military electronics reached 80 per cent of our own. In contrast, Soviet consumers received only about 25 per cent of the TV's and other electronics which went to American civilians.

A few months ago your Institute, as representatives of the electric power industry of the United States, sent a delegation to the Soviet Union. Some of your members had an opportunity to observe firsthand Seviet progress in the field of electric power.

Today I should like to share with you some of my thoughts on the Soviet challenge in all its aspects - military, economic, and subversive.

Communism is somewhat like electricity, as all-persunsive and revolutionary force.

Its leaders are dedicated to achieving a victory that will be evidenced by the liquidation of capitalism and the emergence of a Sovietized world order. The most straightforward way to accomplish this objective would be by direct military action. However, large scale military attack on the West seems to be ruled out as a calculated Soviet policy, at least while the nuclear forces of the East and West remain in reasonable belance.

However, the Soviet leaders are not satisfied with the current balance of military power in the world. They are making stremmus efforts to achieve a position of superiority. A large share of their scientific and technical capabilities are devoted to research on advanced weapons systems.

The Soviet Union concentrated on ballistic missiles early, exploiting the many German assets at the close of World War II. They had a native progress underway by 1946 which was given a high priority. By February of 1959, Marshall Malinevsky, the Soviet Minister of Dafense, could say,

"The armed forces (have been equipped) with a whale series of military ballistic rockets of intercontinental, continental, long, medium, and short range."

At the same time they are building formidable long-range striking capabilities and adding to air defense, the Soviet Union maintains an army of two and one half million men. The tradition of universal military training is being continued. Modernization has not been neglected. The Soviet Army today is fully equipped with a postwar generation of tanks and artillery. Their policy is one of maintaining massive conventional forces while adding advanced weapons systems.

The Soviet subsarine strength today is many times the strength with which Germany entered World War II. This force poses a grave threat to Allied task forces and sea lines of communication. We believe that for years the Soviet sub-erows have familiarized themselves with world waterways by serving in Blac marchant ships and fishing fleets. The size of the subsarine fleet now seems well established; the future trank will be toward nuclear-propolled and missile-launching types.

All this costs the Seviets a great deal of money. Despite the Eremlin leaders claim to be pursuing a policy of "peaceful co-existence," military outlays enjoy a first priority in their planning. The USSR's military effort, as a proportion of gross national product, is greater than that of any other mation in the world. Stated another way, this means that the diversion of economic resources to military support is without any parallel in the peacetime history of the West.

The Soviets hide much of their military expenditures behind a vail of secrecy. What they amounce as "defense expenditures," a one line entry in the annual budget, cannot cover more than about 60 per cent of their total effort. The resainder is buried in budgetary accounts with impocuous titles. For example, most military research and development is paid for out of an account labelled, "Social and Cultural Expenditures."

As Soviet military capabilities have grown, their foreign palicy has become more assertive. In 1955 during the Summa crisis, missile restling was first unveiled as a new testic of Soviet diplomency. The lines of conflict with the West have been more sharply drawn in the past year. The Communists have deliberately been agitating two of the most dangerous and potentially explosive areas of the world -- The Taiwan Straits and Berlin.

I do not interpret this increased belligerence to mean that the Soviet Union is planning to provoke the United States into a war. They have great respect for our capability to devestate the URER. They will continue to probe and to test, and where feasible will support other countries in aggression by proxy.

I would like to turn now to the highlights of the economic aspects of the Coviet challenge. The new confidence of Marushchev, the very vocal Soviet leader, rests on his conviction that the final victory of communism will be achieved mainly by non-military

means. The proceedings of the recent 21st Party Congress laid out this objective without equivocation. I think of it as the Soviet economic order of battle.

Enrushenev in six hours and ten minutes of opening remarks and three and a balf hours of closing remarks, said in effect,

economic might of the Soviet Union on the basis of the priority growth of heavy industry which will insure the victory of the Soviet Union in penceful economic competition with the capitalist countries our success in the fulfillment of the plan will attract millions of new adherents and give communion a decimive edge in the interactional belance of power"

How serious is the challenge of Soviet economic growth?

Before Looking into the future, let's take a minute to review the past. As has been uptly said, the past is the prologue of the future.

In the short space of 30 years, the Soviet thick has grown from a relatively bookward nation into the second largest economy in the world. It is true that their headlong pace of industrialization has slowed down moderately in the past few years. I find no confort in this. It is not important that the Soviet rate of

development has moderated. What is important is that it continues to be far more rapid than our own.

Let's look at some recent history. During the past seven years, Soviet industry has grown at an amount rate of 9% per cent. This is not the official rate the Soviets have amounteed. It is a reconstruction of Soviet data, deflated for known differences with our own Federal Reserve Beard index.

We can compare the Soviet performance with that of UE industry in the 1950-57 period. I have dropped back one year in our case to avoid dispute about the inclusion of 1956 as non-representative. Even giving the UE the benefit of this adjustment, our recent annual industrial growth rate has been 3.6 per cent. This means that Soviet industry has been growing roughly two and a half times as rapidly as industry in the United States.

I do not emplose from this analysis that the secret of Soviet success lies in greater efficiency. On the contrary. In comparison with the leading free enterprise economics of the West, the Communist system is relatively inefficient.

The secret of Soviet amones is simple. It lies in the fact that the Kremlin leaders direct a far higher proportion of total resources to national policy purposes than does the United States. I define national policy purposes to include, among other things, defense and investment in industry.

Somhere are the contrasts in national objectives cleared than in the investment field. First of all, Soviet national product is only some to to 45 per cent of US national product. However, the dollar value of Soviet investment is already about three quarters of that of the US.

Secondly, Seviet investment in industry is now running some 10 to 20 per cent higher than such outlays in our own country.

In comparison, our capital expenditures for transportation and communications are more than double the comparable Soviet expenditures. This reflects, in large part, our messive highway building program. US investment spending for highways has been running 15 to 20 times comparable Soviet spending.

Commercial investment, which includes stores, shopping centers, and drive-in-movies, has been absorbing over six billion dollars a year in the UE, compared to less than two billion in the UECR.

Our housing investment has been running nearly twice that of the Soviete, even though living space per cepits in the United States is already over four times that in the UNEX.

Further, although the Soviet economy has increased its output of communer goods in recent years, production of communer durables is far below that of the US. For example, in 1958 the USER manufactured only one-tenth the number of home refrigerators and Increases as the US and only one-seventh the

number of home washing machines. Furthermore, most of the UE output is for replacement, while that of the UESR is for first time users.

In 1958, a bad year for the US auto industry, we still produced about 35 times the number of passenger care as the USSE. Kirusheisev says the Soviet people are on the read from socialism to communism; it is clear that when the Russians arrive in orbits, they will not be driving their own care.

In success, these contrasts explain the principal research for Soviet successes. Their occases is genred to economic growth; ours is genred to increasing consumer entisfections and the standard of living.

What of the future? In Khrushchev's words, "The Doviet Union intends to outstrip the United States economically ... to surpass the level of production in the United States means to exceed the highest indexes of capitalism."

Enrushment's ambitious seven your plan establishes the formidable task of increasing industrial production about 30 per cent by 1966.

Steel production is to be pushed close to 100 million net toms. Communication is set at a level somewhat higher than industry forcests place United States production in 1955.

The energy base is to be revolutionized. Crude oil and natural gas will constitute more than one half of the total energy supply, and relatively high cost coal will be far loss beservant than now.

by 1965, the USER plane to produce about 480 billion kilomett hours of electricity. As your one comparative study pointed out, this means that the absolute gap between US and USER power production vill increase somewhat over the next seven years.

Your interesting study received a considerable assount of deserved publicity. Unfortunately, some commentators concluded from your findings that the absolute gap between US and UNIX production would continue to increase serves the board.

A comparison of primary energy production in the two countries shows that this is not so. Doviet production of each, petrologs, natural gas and hydroelectric power, expressed in standard fuel units, associated to 45 per cent of the UI in 1958. By 1965 it will be close to 60 per cent. The absolute gap has been closing since 1950. It will continue to narrow over the next serves years.

Similarly, the absolute gap in steel <u>production</u> has been chosing over the past five years. The maximum gap in steel <u>especity</u> apparently was reached in 1958.

"disciples of the absolute gap" has been chattered. History has overtaken those well-measing people who shrugged off the flowist rate of growth as 'no problem because absolute increases in output were rusning higher in the Ui than in the USSA.

At the same time, it is important not to emaggerate Soviet prospects in the economic race. In the propagation surrounding the launching of the Seven Year Flan, Ehrushchev ands a number of statements about Soviet economic power which were wishful thinking. Specifically he stated time, "after the completion of the Seven Year Flan, we will probably used about five more years to catch up with and outstrip the United States in industrial output. Thus, by that time (1970), or perhaps even somer, the Seviet Union will advance to first place in the world both in absolute volume of production and in per capits production."

First of all, to reach such improbable conclusions, the Erealin leaders overstate their present comparative position. They claim UNES industrial output to be 50 per cent of that of the US. However, their our data on electric power input into industry in 1976 were by per cent, not 50 per cent, of comparable power input into US industry. I know of no magic in the Communicat system which would permit the value of output to be disproportion whely high in relation to inputs. Further, all of our our analyses

of Soviet industrial output last year was about 40 per cent of our own.

Secondly, Khrushchev forecasts that our future industrial growth will be only two per cent a year. If this is true, the thirted States will be virtually committing economic satelds. By 1965, we would have a burden of unemployment worse than that in the 1930's. This prediction I regard as untenable.

A some realistic prejection would place 1965 Seviet industrial production at about 55 per cent of our own. By 1970, assuming the same relative rates of growth, U.S. industrial output, as a whole, would be about 66 per cent of that in the United States.

Further, when Ehrushebev provides his people the world's highest standard of living by 1970, this is patently nonsense. It is as though the shring had learned to whistle, to use one of his colorful commuts.

These Soviet exaggerations are a standard tool of Communist propagation. The propagation should not blind us, however, to the solvering implications of their expected economic progress.

First of all, rapid economic growth will provide the Erselin leaders with additional resources to intensify the arms race. If recent trends continue, I would not be surprised to see Soviet military spending increase by over 50 per cent in the next seven years. The further strengthening of great military power,

Mirashchev apparently believes, will deter the West from countering Soviet Bloc advanturies.

Decountly, additional improvement can be made in the standards of living of the Russian people. It is only since the death of Stalin that serious attention has been given to improving the standards of living of the Russian people. The moderate slow-down in the headlong growth of heavy industry has been caused, in large part, by the diversion of resources to bousing, to agriculture, and to consumer goods.

Living standards, based on present Soviet plans, are expected to increase about 50 per cent over the next seven years.

This level, if echieved, will still be far below that our own
citizens are enjoying. However, it will look very good to the
peoples of underdeveloped countries, and most importantly,
represent a goal such countries could hope to achieve by following
the Comments pattern of development.

Finally, achievement of the goals of the Soviet Seven Year Plan will provide the there-with-all to push the expansion of Communium in the uncommitted metions. By 1965, Soviet output of many basic raw materials and industrial products will be approaching, and in a few cases exceeding, that of the United States. Next proximently, these products will be the kind that are medical for industrialization in the less developed countries.

The outcome of this contest, the Communist challenge in underdeveloped areas, is crucial to the survival of the Proc Werld.

The world is in an unprecedented epoch of change. Within little more than ton years, over three quarters of a million people, in twenty one nations, have become independent of colonial rule. In all of these newly emergent countries, there is intense nationalism coupled with the determination to achieve a better way of life.

The leaders of world commution are alart to the opportunity which this great transformation provides them. They realize the future of commution can be insured only by expansion, and that the best hope of such expansion lies in Asia and Africa.

International communium has carehalled its political, economic and majorarive weapons in vigorous action programs. Communium is grinly determined to win this contest.

On the economic penetration front, the Communist program moved into high gear during 1950. The equivalent of ever one billion collars in new credits were extended to underdeveloped countries by the MDSR, its European Satellites, and Communist China.

Over 4,000 Bloc technicisms have been sent to assist the development of Free Forld nations. About 70 per cent of these

technicions are engaged in communic activities. Others are reorganizing local military establishments and teaching Bloc military doctrine to indigenous personnel.

The Bloc also has a well developed program for training stadents from underdeveloped countries behind the iron cartain. About 3,200 students, technicisms, and military epocialists nave now received such training.

The USES, with its greater prostige, negotiates agreements and provides sajer credits. Actual implementation is frequently assigned to the European satellites. This technique crables the Soviet Union to exert remines control over the Bloc penatration program. It also brings the combined economic strength of the satellites and the USES to bear in each target country.

This reserve economic and military aid progress is concertinated in only a few countries. India, which has received over \$325 million of Bloc grants and credits, is a primary recipient. The economic showplece is the Bhilai sheel mill, being built by the Suspiens.

It is true that the Soviet technicisms belying to build the steel plant have not, with few exceptions, engaged in sub-versive activity. However, the cooperative presence of Soviet personnel, the highly visible symbols of assistance and the barrage

of soviet ratio promounts outline to create a climate in which extremates one grow.

eppears to be a typical Connected Frank organization. Organized cuty a few years sep, it see claims 60 breaches. Seven of these are located in Madiya Predesh State, where the Russian standard will in located, including one in Bullet itself.

What is times front organizations to? They show fill which are pro-communist, or which deplot alleged structions constituted by American soldiers.

Through Libraries and Josephia, they opered clasted property of the emergic, in many Indian cities today you can see a large window clast titled, "Industrial Growth, USSS and USA."

It should be in every handbook as an example of how to congress classication for may occasion.

This chart begins and ends with the two worst periods
for the Shibel States — 1946 and the first quarter of 1950. Using
1946 as a base of 100 per cent for both countries, the statistical
trickery attempts to areate the impression that:

by 1950, Seviet production was one and a ball times greater than that of the UE,

By 1957, Bowlet output was five these larger than that of the US, and that

The first quarter decline in US production wiped out US increases in recent years.

The artist added his socialist realism to the work of the statistical manipulation. The USER line is backed by a massive oil cracking plant with Kremlin-like baraque clock towers. The US is represented by a pot-ballied, dark spectacled that Eas, standing on the US production line and bending far backwards in order to view the exhaulted loval of Soviet production. To cap it all, Uncle San's log is conveniently placed to hide our best years of growth.

To a moghisticated audience, this crude manipulation would be laughed away. But it is aimed at a most-literate group of Indian workers, and to this audience, it is effective. The impe Indian state of Merals is now governed by Communists.

Although still small, the Communist party is growing.

Turning to the Middle Rest, Iraq provides a prime example of the opportunistic nature of the Bloc's aid program.

Prior to the comp d'etat on July leth last year, Iraq's economic involvement with Communist nations had been negligible. In the peat nine menths, the UESR has provided over \$250 million of military and economic development credits. The Iraq Development Board has dropped its two Nestern advisors. Vestern

technicisms were also dismissed and several contracts with Western Firms carcalled. Increasingly, Coneral Quasin's regime is dependent on dessertio communicate augment to maintain itself; the number of Communicate in high government posts is growing.

As in Iraq, the Communists edept programs which nouse appealing to many people in underdeveloped nations. They are always the proposents of pasce, co-existence, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and positive nationalism. A Moscor trained Communist may, for mostle and even years, identify bisself completely with national arbitisms. Ills true colors as an agent of International Communism do not show until the Dateful day of telegover.

Dissistions to the people of the International Communist movement, the propagative barrage is heavy. Millions of change books in
local languages are published and circulated. Text books are
provided for subset children. Confo strips are used entersively
to get across the Communist message to the less obscated people.
The Soviets and the Communist Chinose do more propagative radio
broadcounting them all of the rest of the countries of the world
providence, published in 80 different languages, all of which
appear to be originated locally but which carry the message of
the Kronlin.

My purpose today has been to outline for you the dimensions of the Soviet challenge.

In Western Surope, the Ganger has been faced and contained. The extensive Communist perstruction of Greece and the threat to Turboy were through back by the Greek-Turkish assistance program. The Paraball Plan and MATO and the vigorous programs for West Turbopean unity have substantially reduced Communist power in the last several years. The Communist Party still has powerful indiscove in the labor severance of France and Italy but even in these countries the advance of communist has been decisively checked.

In many other areas of the world there is not yet an adequate understanding of the serversive peril of Communication. We must realize that the chaice between communication for great masses of people as it might seem to us.

In two many mations of Asia and Africa, per capita incomes average loss than (100 a year. Life expectancies are bull those of the advanced mations of the Nest. Illiteracy is the rule, not the exception. To these people, determined to establish quickly a decent standard of living, the Soviet story of regis economic growth is a magnet.

The Free World has the resources to meet, contain and overcome the challenge of Soviet power. As the strangest ration in the Free World, the United States must be the leader. The real Canger, as I see it, is the possibility of our complement satisfaction, our prescription with raising the already high standards of living of the world's meet affinent society. The tragety of our time would be to fail to recognise the realities of the Soviet deallange, to fail to react to it with the vigor and force its gravity requires.